fusion centres have always been prone to contamination of their hands with donor blood; in the bottle washing departments, where used equipment is reprocessed, the risk has been highest as also has been the risk of pricking the skin with contaminated needles (10 to 20 times per day per person). One would, therefore, anticipate a high incidence of homologous serum jaundice, of Au antigen carriers or perhaps a high incidence of resistant antibody carriers. The facts are very different.
In the author's laboratory, which is a typical regional blood transfusion centre, not one carrier of antigen or antibody has been found amongst staff exposed to these risks. During a seventeenyear period the centre has employed a total of 1043 people and the present day establishment is 216. During the time quoted, only one case of jaundice has been reported and that was in a junior technician where the history was suggestive of infectious hepatitis and in whom neither Au antigen nor antibody can be detected today.
According to Dr W d'A Maycock (personal communication) there have been 42 cases of jaundice reported from all blood transfusion centres in England and Wales in the period 1951-71. It is not known how many people have been employed totally during that time, but the present establishment of all centres is 2000-2500 people.
In view of experience in blood transfusion centres it is probable that the high incidence of hepatitis in staff working in renal dialysis units is related to a more dangerous form of the hepatitis antigen carried in the blood of patients with renal failure.
Reports from expert committees (see references) have been of great value in high-lighting dangers in laboratories and have been instrumental in raising the standards of personal hygiene. However, where the blood transfusion laboratory is concerned, there is a real danger of lowering the standards of blood group serology by insisting on technicians wearing impractical clothing and practising unfamiliar and cumbersome techniques. If it is intended that such measures are to be restricted to the handling of high risk material only, this fact should be clarified and a better definition is required of 'high risk samples'.
Much more attention must be paid to the packing and transport of blood samples as a high percentage received at reference laboratories still leak and soil accompanying letters. It is not always possible to reject leaky samples as suggested in the Rosenheim Report (1972) -many are for urgent cross-match tests and others are unrepeatable such as those from the umbilical cords of newborn infants. Certain laboratory hazards such as mouth pipetting and aerosols from centrifuges are now well publicized. In the blood transfusion (hamatology) laboratory a less well known but highly potent source of aerosol is the simple Pasteur pipette which causes widespread dissemination of fine droplets during rinsing operations. It is sometimes possible to replace the Pasteur pipette by installing a fully automated procedure. However, when blood grouping is automated one should beware of the daily output of about 20 yards (18 m) of filter paper studded with contaminated effluent in the form of blood tests. These dry off in the air and may well be a source of contamination of the laboratory environment. With the advent of centralization many more of these machines could be operating in future hematology laboratories. Most body fluids, in particular blood, may contain vast amounts of hepatitis agent.
Post-mortem room practices leave much to be desired and the post-mortem room is still a hazardous place where hepatitis and tuberculosis are major dangers.
Corpses come from the hospital and from coroners in the area. The former are the most likely sources of hepatitis, especially those from renal dialysis and transplantation units. As a general rule, it is wise to regard all transplant cases and every jaundiced body with suspicion. Requests for necropsy often arrive without clinical notes and with no notification whether the patient was Australia antigen-positive or not. This defect in communication is one of the major hazards in a large, busy hospital.
All bodies should be handled with gloves both before and after the necropsy. Blood leaks may occur on both occasions and may cause infection with the agent.
No pathologist should fear to do a necropsy on an Australia antigen-positive case, but before doing so he should be thoroughly aware of the risks that exist.
The body is usually wrapped in a shroud, secured by safety pins; pricks from these may be dangerous.
Most mortuary refrigerators have fairly narrow, heavy doors that are readily damaged and splintered by trolleys.
If a post-mortem room is to have three or more tables it is wise to have one of them in a separate room. This obviates the hazard of infectious cases being done in a crowded room and also facilitates cleaning and disinfection afterwards.
Once the body is on the table it is essential to rebrief the technicians and to emphasize the need to avoid splashing of fluids and the production of aerosols. A mask and goggles or spectacles should be worn to obviate splashing into eyes and mouth and a reinforcing pair of cotton gloves should be worn over the rubber gloves. Not only do they provide added protection but they also facilitate the handling of slippery organs.
Large effusions into the serous cavities are best removed by a sucker if this is available. If not, careful use of a ladle is the alternative, but splashing is a great risk.
It is probably wise to 'cut your losses' and only remove those organs thought to be clinically abnormal or those that look or feel abnormal at necropsy. Most organs can be sampled for histological purposes without removing them from the body. Unless it is absolutely essential, the brain should be neglected as the hazards of bone dust are too great. Organs are not weighed but their size can be noted because it is most desirable to confine all the effluent to the post-mortem table and not to spread it about the post-mortem room. Any competent pathologist should be able to conduct a necropsy without getting a drop of blood on the floor or above the wrist line of his gloves.
Organs that are removed should be placed uncut in formalin. After a week they can be incised and put into fresh formalin in order to allow thorough perfusion of the tissues with fixative.
During the whole necropsy procedure it is advisable to rinse instruments carefully in strong sodium hypochlorite solution which reduces the risk of contamination by blood.
The body is reconstituted by packing the cavities with cotton wqol soaked in strong hypochlorite. The process of stitching up can be hazardous and it is wise to reiterate precautions yet again.
Leaks of blood may occur from the stitch line after restoration of the body. We seal the corpse into a transparent polythene bag. This then protects morticians who subsequently may handle the body and, more especially, the undertakers who are less familiar with the hazards of hepatitis.
Many would say that there will be no hazards from hepatitis in the post-mortem room because they refuse to do the necropsies. This is more a reflection of bad technique and hygiene than sound judgment. The pathologist's responsibility is, however, great, and briefing of staff, both mortuary and laboratory, is essential. All may handle infected specimens and all should be prepared to do so.
Dr June D Almeida (Wellcome Research Laboratories, Beckenham, Kent)
Control of Australia Antigen-positive Hepatitis Within Hlmodialysis Units
The presence of considerable amounts of blood that could be positive for Australia antigen (Au-Ag) means that standards of hygiene within artificial kidney units must be maintained at an extremely high level. However, in addition to matters of hygiene, there is also the question of how to segregate groups and individuals within the unit so as to minimize the spread of serum hepatitis.
The turnover of patients can be considerable within a hmmodialysis unit and a negative Au-Ag test at admission does not guarantee that the patient is not incubating the disease. The heemodialysis unit at the Hammersmith Hospital has experienced two outbreaks of Au-Ag-positive hepatitis and it was observed that patients who had been infected in the first outbreak did not *contract the disease a second time (even although they were re-exposed to it). The protective mechanism in these patients is not clear as none had retained circulating antibody and the evidence on the presence of cell-mediated immunity is conflicting.
In spite of this, it was decided to accept that they did seem able to resist reinfection. On this basis, new patients were brought into the unit on nights when only cases who had experienced Au-Ag were present. Careful laboratory testing had established that none of these previously positive patients retained Au-Ag.
The rationale for this procedure is that the new, possibly infectious, patient is dialysed among subjects seemingly able to withstand infection, and in addition the new patient is less likely to be infected, as a sporadic case of serum hepatitis is unlikely to occur within this group.
